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Dealing with a two-level federal system, Janes Buchanan has 
pointed out that as a result of variations in state income and wealth 
levels, equal-income taxpayers in separate states inevitably receive 
unequal fiscal treatment, either in the form of unequal benefits for the 
same amount of taxes or equal benefits for unequal tax payments."'" This 
means that in two states where benefits are equal and there is a higher 
proportion of high—income taxpayers in one than in the other, then any 
individual taxpayer in the high—income state will make smaller tax 
payments than his equal—income counterpart in the low—income state. If 
taxes are equalised, benefits will be less for the taxpayer in the low-
income state. It is technically impossible to reach any other result 
where state per capita incomes are unequal. This is said to be so under 
any tax system short of the limiting case of a fiscal system operating 
2 
on a pure benifit principle. Prior to the appearance of Buchanan's 
article? equal treatment for equals had usually been interpreted to mean 
equal tax burdens. By introducing the benefit side, Buchanan was able to 
take account of "aggregate fiscal pressure" on a taxpaying unit, and 
gave the name "fiscal residuum" to the algebraic difference between taxes 
paid and benefits received from public services. Specifically, he 
showed that an individual would be subject to the least fiscal pressure 
the higher the per capita income and wealth of the state in which he 
resided; i.e., the higher the state's per capita income, the lower the 
fiscal residuuc. ~Jhilc granting that fiscal pressure could be equali-
zed among equals through fiscal centralisation, Buchanan maintained his 
1. James M. Buchanan, "Federalism and Fiscal Equity", 
American Economic Review, Vol. XL, Ho. k (September 1950), pp. 583-599. 
2, Another limiting case would be a head tax with the proceeds 
distributed in any fashion. In point of fact, unequal fiscal residua 
result only when tax liability is related to income or wealth, which, 
to be sure, are the bases of virtual!}' all tax systems „ 
well-iinown preference for decentralisation and proposed a geographically 
discriminatory federal income tax as the device to equalize fiscal residua 
regardless of the taxpayer's location,, He emphasised that under this 
arrangement, states would retain complete fiscal autonomy, 
' choosing whatever types of 
tarr.es' and expenditures they prefer at the levels they prefer. The task 
of the federal government would be merely to equalise fiscal residua 
between equals in alternative locations. 
Uhile focusing on a two-level system, Buchanan noted that the con-
clusions applied to the other levels of the federal system as well. On 
othe local -level, where most revenue is raised through the property tax, 
differences in tax capacity depend more on per capita real estate values 
in a community, including the value of business and industrial estab-
lishments and less directly on the income levels of the individuals re-
siding within it. On the other hand, the need for public services is 
probably inversely related to the per capita wealth of a community, with 
socia.1 welfare and educational costs reaching higher per capita levels 
where low-income families are concentrated, TJhile it is true that high 
income communities usually spend more per pupil on education, per capita 
or per family coots are often lower because of the existence of fewer 
children per family0 This is a function of lower birth rates and a 
larger proportion of older families in the high-wealth communities. 
Suburban communities are well aware of these facts and consequently 
welcome small, high—income families, clean, light industry and office 
centres while discouraging the settlement of low-income, 1ow-taxpaying 
families who consume high levels of public services. These goals are 
most often achieved by means of large lot zoning. In the Hew York Region, 
the City is surrounded in all directions by a ring up to 40 miles in 
circumference where virtually all undeveloped residential land is zoned 
for residences on half-acre lots or larger- Even where small lot zoning 
exists, the same end is achieved by permitting only typo of residential 
construction whose property tax yield is estimated to be greater than the 
marginal expenditures associated with families who occup3^ the units. 
Garden apartments which average far fewer school-age children per unit 
Mian low-and middle-range single—family dwellings are considered to be 
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more "profitable" in this respect than single—family dwellings in the 
f000 class, except where their rent is too "low" and thereby attract 
families with higher than average numbers of children. 
In Buchananls terms, communities which operate in this fashion are 
trying, not so much to minimize expenditure, but to minimize the fiscal 
residua of residents. This article is essentially an attempt to measure 
that fiscal residua for a family of particular type in a cross—section of 
280 suburban communities in the New York City Region in 19^5. 
The purpose of the study is twofold. The first was suggested by 
4 
Charles Tiebout in his article "A. Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," 
where he hypothesized that movement to suburban communities takes place 
on the basis of a family's preference for a particular collection of 
expenditure benefits. Communities vary in the mix and level of benefits 
they offer; the family chooses the one, ceteribus paribus, which most 
closely meets its preference pattern for public goods. In talcing account 
of the tax side,, we refine the Tiebout approach and convert it to a 
fiscal residuum measure. While the level and type of expenditure may 
still be the principal public finance locational criterion, fiscal residua 
comparisons allow choices between communities providing similar sets of 
public services, on the basis of relative cost. Maximizing a fiscal 
residuum as such is then not so much the goal as maximising it where ex-
penditure levels and patterns are comparable. Specifically, we intend to 
show the extent to which fiscal residua vary and relate these to expen-
diture levels. 
The second purpose is to explain the variation in the fiscal residua 
among connunities. I/hile this attempt is limited in scope, we are able to 
indentify one variable which is a statistically significant factor in 
accounting for differences among the fiscal residua. 
Exp end i tur e s 
Some expenditures which governments make have no value, or even 
negative value, for our representative family and should thus be excluded 
3 It should be noted here that we define "fiscal residuum" in a way 
opposite Buchanan's definition! i.e., as the algebraic difference between 
expenditure benefits and taxes. Our taxpayers are concerned, therefore, 
with maximizing their fiscal residua rather than minimizing them. 
4 Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LVII, ITo. 4 (December 1949), 
pp. 4lS - 424. 
_ h. _ 
fron the computation of the fiscal residuum. For example, a relatively-
high—income family x«mld place no value on welfare expenditures for which 
it is not eligible. Consequently in the computation of benefits, we 
include only those that are valued and perceived; i.e., those most akin to 
consumer's goods. "Je thus exclude welfare and other redistributive 
expenditures as well as those which tend to be perceived as equal between 
communities such as fire and police protection, sewage disposal and trash 
collection. 
Since we are dealing with two states, New York-and New Jersey, and 
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ten counties, differences in public benefits result from state and county 
as well as local expenditures. Thus all levels of government except the 
federal government are included. Taxes and expenditures of the latter are 
not taken into consideration, since they are roughly equal for equal income 
individuals, no matter where they reside in the Region. 
We have chosen as our standard family, one which consists of four 
j)ersons, including two school—age children, which has a family income of 
#12,500 per year and lives in a #25,000 home which it is assumed to own. 
!"/e chose this relatively high level of income for the reason that we 
consider it necessary deal with a family that has a choice among alter-
native locations. Below this income level, families either have an 
extremely limited choice among suburban communities, or must of necessity 
5"ln New Jersey, all suburban communities in Essex, Bergen and Union , 
Counties, exclusive of those with extreme incpme levels were included. In 
Morris, Somerset and Passaic Counties, only communities within commuting 
range of New York City were used in the sample. In New York State, all of 
Nassau County was included along with portions of ¥estchester, Rockland 
and Suffolk Counties, choice again being based on income levels and dis-
tance from New York City. 'But unlike New Jersey where data was available for 
fox"- all communities chosen, the existence of a maze of overlapping dis-
tricts with taxation and expenditure powers in New York made fiscal resid-
uum computations for some communities impossible. Even where calculations 
were possible, variations within a particular community were in many in-
stances so minor, it would have distorted the statistical tests to count 
them as separate observations. Thus many communities or ports of—them had 
to be dropped. As a result, data for New York State is more limited and 
somewhat cruder than for New Jerse3>", and for the most part organized on 
the basis of school districts rather than on the basis of more conventional 
political units. 
In addition to the above, fiscal residua were calculated for nine 
"old cities." These are Bayonne, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Newark, Passaic 
and Paterson in Now Jersey, and Mount Vernon, Yonkers and New York City 
in New York, 
remain apartment dwellers in the major cities of the Region. 
For such a family, the most important public service is undoubtedly 
the quality of elementary and high school education in a community — 
roughly approximated by average x^ er pupil expenditures, Gince the 
family is assumed to have two school-age children, this figure is doubled 
so as to represent the total educational benefit it receives. To this 
educational variable, we have added per capita expenditures on higher 
education by local and state governments, per capita state expenditure 
on educational assistance and subsidies,^ and per capita county educa-
tional expenditures, T/hile it may seem strange to add per capita data 
to per pupil data, it can be justified in terms of our orientation, i.e., 
how does a prospective resident measure benefits which accrue to him in 
a particular community? Certainly, as a proxy for quality, it would be 
inappropriate to measure local educational benefits on anything but a 
per pupil basis, since varying age compositions of communities would 
distort per capita comparisons. On the other hand, since age composition 
is not significantly different between the three states in the Region, 
per capita higher educational expenditure is a reasonable measure of the 
quality of siate colleges and universities, and more particularli^, of the 
number of available student spaces within the institutions. For other 
expenditure categories such as parks and. libraries, we also use per 
capita data since no other measure is sensible. Consequently, we end 
not with an exact measure of perceived expenditures and revenues, but 
rather with a proxy dollar figure showing the value of a set of benefits 
as against the cost of receiving them. 
The other benefits in the compilation are those made for parks and 
recreation) for highways in the county of residence by the state and 
county governments, and in the locality by the municipal governmentj for 
local libraries; and for state hospitals. Table I recapitulates in-
cluded expenditures by level of government. 
^ Ilot to be confused with per pupil aid which is included in the 
local governments1 expenditure. Assistance and subsidies describe 
such state programs as those for the handicapped and for veterans. 
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?able I 
,a PERCEIVED EXPENDITURE BENEFITS" FOR FAMILY OF FOUR 
#12,500 INCOME 
.Gnontar3>- and High Gchool 
Education 
Higher Education 
State Hospitals 
Parks and Recreation' 
Highways 
Libraries 
f 
Level of Government 
Local 
X 
county 
e 
p" X° 
a Per capita, unless otherwise notec 
iJer pupil ezpenditures X2 „ 
c assistance and subsidies,, 
a New York City only, 
e 
County governments spend some funds on community colleges in 
New York State. These are, however, quite small. 
x Includes state government forestry expenditure. 
In county of residence. 
Certainly it is debatable whether some of these are, in fact, 
perceived expenditures. For example, residents of northern New Jersey 
might place more value on state parks in adjacent New York than in New 
Jersey. I/hether the quality of state hospitals for the chronically or 
mentally ill is a factor taken into consideration in choice of residence 
is also debatable. Uhile expenditure on state parks is a samll item with 
little variation between states, expenditures on hospitals are much 
larger, with approximately a #10 x^ er capita differential between New -
Jersey at the low end and New York at the high. Further, while the 
condition, of local streets and roads may be a significant consideration 
to suburbanites dependent on automobile transportation, the most im-
portant roads for particular persons may be in adjacent localities, 
City 
counties or states. And to New York/residents who are not owners of 
automobiles, expenditure on local streets nay well be a natter of in-
difference. Certainly these issues cannot be resolved satisfactorily 
short of an opinion survey regarding what factors these families do, in 
7 
fact, consider. 
Taxes 
On the tax side, we have included all state and local incone, excise 
and property taxes, excluding business and other taxes which nay be 
shifted to consumers, but only after a hard-to-trace process. For Hew 
York City, Newark, Jersey City and Yonkers where the representative family 
was assumed to occupy rental quarters, real property taxes were assigned 
by applying the residential tax rate to the average value of housing for 8 
that income class. For all of the suburbs and the remainder of the "old 
cities," the representative family was assumed to own and occupy a dwells-*" 
ing with a market value of $25,000. For these families, local property 
tax burdens including school, village and county taxes, if any, were com-
puted for each individual locality on a standardised basis. Federal 
inclme tax offsets were computed for the homeowners to take account of the 
effect of mortgage interest and property tax deductibility. Offsets were 
also computed to take account of the federal tax advantage that families 
paying How York State and Hew York City income and sales taxes had over 
those who are not subject to then. Sales and excise taxes were estimated 
using tli'r Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey and 
Internal Revenue Service tables as bases for tax allocation. 
For non-New York City residents, two tax computations were made. 
The first assumed that the family head worked in the county of his 
residence and was thus subject solely to income and sales taxes levied by 
his state only, in addition to local taxes. The second computation 
assumed that the family head commuted to work in Hew York City and thus 
became subject to Hew York City income and sales taxes plus the Hew York 
State incone tax if he was commuting from Hew Jersey. The income tax was 7 "What sketchy information we do have from a Regional Plan Associa-
tion survey on housing and locational preferences indicates that good 
schools, parks, recreation facilities, and libraries are characteristics con 
considered "very desirable" by a high proportion of respondents. See 
Regional Plan Association, Public Participation in Regional! Planning, A 
Report of the Second Regional Plan, October 1967. 
8 According to Census data., a majority of families in the ^10,000-^15,000 
income class reside in rental quarters in these cities. In all other mun-
icipalities, owner-ccouplers predominate. 
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computed using- Statistics of Income data to estimate deductions. With 
respect to the Hew York City sales tax, commuters were assumed to spend 
#500 per year, or #2 per working day on items subject to it. 
The Data 
Of the 280 suburban communities for which fiscal res'idua were cal-
culated, 125 were in Hew Jersey and 155 in Hew York. In every case but 
one, the fiscal residuum was positive, a result of our assumption that 
the standard family contained two school-age children. The spread of the 
residua is vast; for non—commuters they range from #253 in Victory Gardens 
a small Morris County, ITew Jersey community, to #3?991 in Hawthorne, an 
unincoporated portion of Mount Pleasant Township in Westchester County, 
Hew York. For commuters to Hew York City, the range is from minus #37 to 
#3? 959, the same communities occupying the extremes. The Hew York range 
for non—commuters is from #475 to #3? 991; for Hew Jersey non—commuters, 
from #253 to #1,784. For commuters, the Hew York range is #443 to 
#3,959? the Hew Jerse^r extremes, minus #37 and #1,494. 
Table II shows the distribution of the fisca.1 residua for the entire 
two—state area for non-commuters and commuters along with the arithmetic 
mean and the standard deviation for each distribution. In addition, the 
means for Hew York and Hew Jerse3^ are shorn separately. These appear to 
differsignificantly at #1,101 for Hew York non—commuters and #654 for their 
Hew Jersey counterparts. The differences for commuters are similar. 
The differences between the averages for the commuters and non-
commuters in each state shows the tax cost of commutation, For ITew Jersey 
commuters who become subject to both Hew York City and Hew York State 
taxes, the increment amounts to #290.. ITew York commuters incur only an 
additional cost of #32 
The variation around the means as indicated by the standard devia-
tion is rather wide. For non—commuters, two-thirds of the fiscal residua 
are between #480 and #1,356. For commuters, the comparable limits are 
#256 and #1,272. 
^ The differences are greater for Yonkers, Jersey City and Newark since 
these commuters who are assumed to occupy rental quarters cannot take 
advantage of real esto.te tax and interest deductions on the income taxes 
to which they become subject by virtue.of commuting. See table VII. 
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Table II 
DISTRIBUTION OP FISCAL RESIDUA FOR NE¥ YORK AND NE¥ JERSEY 
Fiscal 
Residuum Hon—Commuters Commuters 
Negative 0 1 
$ 0-$ 200 0 ' 21 
200- 400 4 51 
400- 600 51 4l 
6oo- 800 70 54 
800- 1 , 0 0 0 7 1 ' 4l 
1,000- 1j 200 31 27 
1,200- 1,400 20 17 
1,400-1,600 20 16 
1, 600- 1, 800 - - 3 " ' 2 
1,800- 2,000 5 4 
Over 2,000 5 5 
TOTAL 280~ 280 
X^ $918 $764 
cf 438 '508 
X—New York 1,101 , 1,069 
-Hew Jersey 654 364 
An examinati on of the data, county by county, seems to indicate a 
strong positive relationship between per capita income and the size of 
the fiscal residuum, due no doubt to the strong positive relationship 
between per capita income and our most important expenditure item, per 
pupil educational expenditure»However, to test for statistical sig-
nificance is a troublesome matter since there is no income data dis-
aggregated to the extent we require. As a proxy for income, we have been 
forced to use per pupil expenditures, recognizing that the dependent 
variable we are attempting to explain (fiscal residuum) consists in part 
of the independent variable itself (per pupil expenditures) and that the 
results are to some extent being forced. But we have considerable con-
fidence that per pupil expenditures are an adequate proxy for per cax^ita 
— _ , 
Jhicjji item is doubled in our computation. 
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income and therefore not totally illegitimate as the independent variable. 
The distribution of" fiscal residua by per pupil educational ex-
penditure for the entire sample is shown .in..Table III. Table XV andV 
show the same data for Hew York and ITew Jersey respectively. In these 
tables and the analysis which follows,, we deal with non-commuter data 
since the commuter data differs from it onl3^ by a constant^"'" which would 
net affect the statistical results. 
Table III 
N0N2C0I4MUTER»S FISCAL RESIDUA FOR NET/ YORK AMD ITER JERSEY 
SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES BY PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE 
Per Pupil Mean Fiscal Number of 
Expendi tur e Residuum Communities 
Under #499 #503 19 
# 500 - 599 596 53 
600 - 699 749 37 
700 - 799 873 21 
800 - 899 812 33 
900 - 999 914 50 
1,000 -1,099 , 1,160 29 
1,100 -1,199 1,309 15 
1,200 -1,299 1,496 12 
1,300 and Over 2,350 11 
TOTAL #918 280 
That is, one constant for New York communities and one for 
ITew Jersey communities. 
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Table IV 
U0N3C0MMUTER* 5 FISCAL RESIDUA FOR I JET 7 YORK SU3URBA1T COMMUNITIES 
3Y PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES 
Per Pupil Mean Number of 
Expenditure Fiscal Residuum Communities 
Under $499 — 0 
$ 500 - 599 — 0 
6oo - 699 — 0 
700 - 799 $ 593 9 
800 - 899 752 30 
900 - 999 902 49 
1,100 -1,199 1,389 15 
1,200 -1,299 1,496 12 
1,300 and Over 2,350 11 
TOTAL $ 1 , 1 0 1 155 
Table V 
NON—COMMUTER1S FISCAL RESIDUA FOR NET/ JERSEY SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES 
BY PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES 
Per Pupil Mean . Number of 
Expenditure Fiscal- Residuum Connunities 
Under $499 $503 19 
$500 - 599 596 53 
600 699 749 37 
700 - 799 1,004 12 
800 - 899 1,413 3 
900 - 999 1 , 2 1 1 1 
1 ,000 - 1 , 0 9 9 — 0 
1,100 -1,199 — 0 
1i200 -1,299 — 0 
1,300 and Over — 0 
TOTAL $ 654 125 
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The formal hypothesis is that the amount of the fiscal residuum in a 
community is related to per pupil educational expenditure. If we define 
I IE I as the average fiscal residuum for those communities whose per pupil 
expenditure falls into the class 31, where I is the total number of 
expenditure classes, then formally we are testing the hypothesis: 
KE1 ~ M32 ~ iZ3>3 
as opposed to 
^31 * M32 ^ ^ 
II 21 
• • © L.L— ~1 • " ^ "32 ^ "33 •••••• •-••"El 
where H^ indicates that the fiscal residuum does vary with per pupil 
expenditures. 
This type of hypothesis can conveniently be tested by analysis of 
variance. The results of four separate tests are iDresented in Table VI. 
Test A for the entire sample combined rejects the null hypothesis 
H and supports the hypothesis E. , i.e. the fiscal residuum does vary 
O - JL .II/1 
with school expenditures, at the one percent level. The chance of 
accidental observation of so large an "3" is less than one out of 100. 
Test B was based on the hypothesis that the. fiscal residuum varied 
by states 
~0 M H Y = M1IJ 
M Ji 1 <T ITY F "IT J 
• • • •. Table VI 
RESULTS 03 ANALYSES OF VARXAIK 
Test A - NY and IT J 
Combined 
by Educational 
EXTD e n d i t u r e 
Test 3 - NY vs. ITJ 
"F" Value 
7.18 
6.56 
5fo Level I 17~> Level 
\ 
^ . 
1.92 
3.87 
2.49 
6.74 
Test C - NY 
by Educational 
Expenditure 6.12 2.07 2 . 7 6 
Test B - NJ 
by Educational 
Expendi ture 3.24 D IC . O O 3.94 
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Here the null hypothesis H^ was rejected at the 5 percent level; the "F" 
statistic being barely shy of the one percent level, 
Finally, tests were conducted for New York and New Jersey separately 
to determine if the fiscal residuum varied with educational expenditure 
within each of the states. The null hypothesis EQ was rejected at the one 
percent level in New York (Test c) and at the 5 percent level in New 
Jersey (Test D)a In the latter, the "F" statistic was just short of the 
required level of rejecting EL at the one percent level. u 
The_01d Cities 
For purposes of comparison with the suburbs, we have confuted the 
fiscal residua for nine "old cities" of the region including Hew York 
City. These are shown in Table VII. 
Comparing these figures with those in Table II, we find that the 
fiscal residua for the Hew Jersey cities are almost identical with those 
in the New Jersey suburbs. Slightly lower pupil expenditure benefits 
and higher poverty-related costs in the City, both of which WDuld tend to 
lower fiscal residua, are probably offset by lower per capita educational 
costs due to a smaller proportion of school—age children relative to 
total population. 
For Hew York State, where we have made computations for only three 
cities, the results are different. The substantial differences in 
average fiscal residua are no doubt due to the fact that per pupil 
educational benefits are substantially higher in the suburbs. These 
differences, which are accentuated by higher poverty-linked exjjenditures 
in central cities are too great to be offset by lower per capita educa-
tional costs. 
Conclusion 
Aside from the desirability of implementing Mie widely accepted 
tax principle of horizontal equity or "equal treatment of equals," 
Buchanan x^ointed out that unequal fiscal pressures; i.et fiscal residua 
can result in a regional allocation of resources different from that 
which would occur as the result of economic considerations alone. In 
general, resource units would be drawn from low to high-income states 
so as to achieve the most favorable fiscal position. 
¥e can see the same influences at work within a region, most likely 
„ „ 
in a much coro imodiato ray, DJh.il e fiscal considerations may be only 
marginal in making location.decisions between regions, once having chosen 
a region on the basis of other considerations} the choice of a high-
income family or businessman- between communities may be strongly influen-
ced by fiscal considerations„ That community which discourages in— 
migration by low—income families so as to keep its tax rate,, low, ceteris 
paribus, is most attractive to the high—income family trying to maximize 
its fiscal residuum and to the coaeany looking for the optimal fiscal 
environment. 
In addition to the effect on fiscal residua and its implications 
for horizontal equity in the tax structure, such occurrences have much 
more pernicious effects. Only recently have wo begun to notice that 
Negroes, in effect '.locked in" the Central City because of zoning and 
construction regulations, in addition to pure discrimination;, have conse-
quently been "locked out" from factory employment which is typically 
expanding in the suburbs and is stagnant in the City. In New York City, 
factory jobs have been declining in number for IV years even as total 
employment in the City has risen. Tlae unskilled who live in the City's 
slums are, of course, hardest hit by this decline, IThen job discrimina-
tion as such is not present, the absence of efficient transportation 
systems moving out of the Central City to the new industrial locations, 
effectively prevents low—income city residents from taking advantage of 
the new employment oxoportunities * 
To the extent that these locational decisions have been based on 
fiscal rather than economic considerations, we have resource misalloca— 
tion in a ptire form with particularly dire implications for the future of 
the City and its residents,, The misaliocation is, moreover, cumulative. 
Higher industrial tax burdens which result from the out-migration of 
businesses further accelerate out-migration, The tax base is further 
reduced and the stage is set fo3" new increases in tax rates or for further 
deterioration of public seivicc:;, 
Happily, the basis for adjustment of unequal fiscal pressure is 
readily available on the local level. Unlike Buchanan's two-level 
system which required a radically changed and possibly unconstitutional 
method of apportioning income tax burdens and incolved a host of 
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practical problems, looa] fiscal inequities can bo eliminated through, well 
tested devices such as state assumption of local functions, consolidation 
of local governments or of some of their functions and increased state 
grants based on need. Certainly there is movement in these directions; 
the recognition that unequal fiscal pressures are as large and widespread 
as they are should hopefully accelerate these fiscal reforms» 
Table V H 
FISCAL RESIDUA IN TEE "OLD CITIES" 
State and City 
Fiscal Residuum 
ITon-C ommut er s Commuters 
Mew York 
Mt,, Vernon 
New York City 
Yonkers 
Average, New York State 
#892 
836 
353 
694 
#860 
312 
586 
New Jersey 
Bayonne 
Elizabeth 
Jersey City 
Newark 
Passaic 
Paterson 
Average, New Jersey 
901 
900 
710 
628 
58( 
310 
671 
611 
610 
338 
256 
290 
20 
347 
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